بررسي و تحليل نظريه معقولات ارادي فارابي و نظريه ادراكات اعتباري علامه طباطبايي

An Analysis an‎d Comparison of al-Fārābīʹs Theory of Voluntary Intelligibles an‎d Allameh Ṭabāṭabāʾīʹs Theory of Iʹtibari Perceptions

فلسفه و كلام اسلامي

Two intellectual systems within Islamic philosophy have sought to explain an‎d analyze practical thought: Al-Farabiʹs Theory of Voluntary Intelligibles an‎d Allameh Tabatabaiʹs Theory of Iʹtibari Perceptions. In the Theory of Voluntary Intelligibles, Al-Farabi presents practical thought as universal, demonstrative, an‎d directed toward true human happiness. In contrast, through the Theory of Iʹtibari Perceptions, Allameh Tabatabai regards practical thought as non-demonstrative an‎d arising from human vital needs while remaining conditioned by changing temporal an‎d spatial circumstances. The apparent contrast between these two approaches—universality an‎d demonstrability on the one han‎d, an‎d particularity an‎d non-demonstrability on the other—necessitates a careful examination of the relationship between these two intellectual systems. Employing a descriptive-analytical, inferential, an‎d comparative approach, the present study examines an‎d analyzes these two theories on the basis of the principal works of both philosophers. The findings reveal that the apparent divergence between them originates from differences in their respective levels of philosophical analysis an‎d cognitive domains. Al-Farabiʹs Theory of Voluntary Intelligibles examines practical thought within the domain of Practical Philosophy, that is, as universal concepts apprehended by the Theoretical Intellect an‎d interpreted from the teleological perspective of true human happiness. By contrast, Allameh Tabatabaiʹs Theory of Iʹtibari Perceptions analyzes practical thought within the domain of Theoretical Philosophy, considering it as the activity of the Practical Intellect in humanityʹs engagement with the material world an‎d its natural needs. One of the principal contributions of this study is the reconstruction of a previously implicit dimension in Al-Farabiʹs philosophy, designated as the Theoretical Philosophy of Voluntary Matters, together with the development of the notion of the Voluntary Intelligible into a comprehensive theoretical framework for describing Practical Philosophy. The analysis further demonstrates that whenever Al-Farabi examines practical thought from the perspective of Theoretical Philosophy—that is, as an inquiry into the genesis of practical thought within the context of time an‎d place an‎d the domain of the Practical Intellect—he appeals to principles such as the Principle of Utility, the Principle of Utilization, an‎d non-demonstrative methods of reasoning, including dialectic an‎d rhetoric. These features exhibit a remarkable convergence with the theoretical foundations of Allameh Tabatabaiʹs Theory of Iʹtibari Perceptions. Accordingly, the difference between these two philosophers does not arise from an intrinsic opposition between their conceptions of practical thought. Rather, it stems from their analyses of human actions at two distinct philosophical levels an‎d the subsidiary issues that arise from each. Recognizing these distinct levels opens new horizons for understan‎ding the functions of the Islamic philosophy of action.

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