تحليل استراتژيك رقابت ميان حمل‌ونقل ريلي و جاده‌اي تحت اثر تخصيص يارانه‌: رويكرد مبتني بر نظريه بازي‌

Strategic Analysis of Competition Between Rail an‎d Road Transport Under the Effect of Subsidy Allocation: A Game Theory Approach

مهندسي راه آهن و برنامه ريزي حمل و نقل

Rail transport, as the backbone of the supply chain, plays a vital role in reducing logistics costs an‎d achieving sustainable development. However, the competitive gap between rail an‎d road networks poses challenges to the efficiency of the rail system. This study analyzes an‎d optimizes the effects of subsidy allocation policies on the productivity of rail freight transport. To model interactions among stakeholders, we develop a three-level hierarchical game-theoretic model. The government acts as the game leader an‎d determines the subsidy allocation strategy. In the second level, rail an‎d road transport operators compete by setting their service prices. Finally, customers form market deman‎d at the third level based on the total costs they face. The proposed model is eva‎luated using operational data from the Port of Bushehr–Tehran route. The results show that targeted subsidies for the rail sector act as an “economic buffer,” stabilizing the return on investment an‎d reducing the system’s vulnerability to deman‎d fluctuations. By lowering the total cost of rail transport, subsidy policy also shifts some market deman‎d from road to rail, increasing rail’s market share an‎d improving the overall efficiency of the transport chain. An assessment of external costs further indicates that this modal shift reduces air pollutant emissions an‎d fossil fuel consumption, thereby generating substantial environmental an‎d social benefits. Sensitivity analysis shows that, although increasing the subsidy level can raise rail’s market share, the relationship between the target market share an‎d the subsidy amount is nonlinear. At higher levels, subsidies yield diminishing returns on investment, revealing the existence of an optimal threshold for subsidy policy. In addition, the findings indicate that optimal subsidy allocation can reduce investment risk in the rail sector by stabilizing revenue an‎d improving the return on investment (ROI), thereby encouraging private-sector participation in the development of rail fleets an‎d infrastructure. Ultimately, the proposed model provides policymakers with an analytical framework for designing more effective support policies for rail transport development while balancing operators’ economic interests with social welfare.

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