تطبيق آراء نفس شناسي جلال الدين دواني و ملارجبعلي تبريزي

Ilm al-Nafs (Psychology) , Soul , Knowledge an‎d Perception , Origination of the Soul , Immateriality of the Soul , Faculties of the Soul

A Comparative Study of the Psychological from the viewpoints of Jalal al-Din Davani an‎d Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi

فلسفه

This thesis aims to compare an‎d analyze the views of two Islamic philosophers, Jalal al-Din Davani an‎d Mulla Rajab Ali Tabrizi, on the soul. Both philosophers, emphasizing the soulʹs significance in understan‎ding the world, presented innovative perspectives. Among Davaniʹs novel contributions are the unity of the soulʹs reality, the explanation of the meaning of mental existence, an‎d providing solutions to its associated doubts. In contrast, Tabrizi offered views such as the simplicity of the soul, the soulʹs knowledge of external entities, the negation of the soulʹs corporeal origination, the proof of the immateriality of the vegetative soul, an‎d serious critiques of the theory of mental existence. Jalal al-Din Davani seeks to prove the origination of the soul by refuting the views of those who believe in its eternality. One of his arguments, which relates to Mulla Rajab Ali Tabriziʹs theory, focuses on the question: How can an eternal soul enter a material body? This question from Davani indicates his incomplete agreement with Tabriziʹs theory regarding the initial separation of the soul from matter. Mulla Rajab Ali Tabrizi considers the initial separation of the soul from matter as the first step in proving the soulʹs immateriality. Tabrizi argues that if the soul is not inherently dependent on matter, its initial entry into matter becomes impossible. Therefore, the soul has a spiritual origination. Davani primarily focuses on the immateriality of the human soul an‎d the nature of mental perceptions, only providing references from previous philosophers regarding the immateriality of the vegetative soul. Tabrizi, however, despite believing in the immateriality of all souls, adopts a different approach an‎d refers to the theory of motion to prove the immateriality of the vegetative soul. Jalal al-Din Davani, by elaborating on the unity of the soulʹs reality, presents an image of the soul in which its faculties are tools for cognition, an‎d the images resulting from these tools possess mental existence. He essentially addresses the question arising from Mulla Rajab Ali Tabriziʹs negation of mental forms by proposing this structure for mental images. In contrast, Mulla Rajab Ali Tabrizi, as a staunch opponent of mental existence, negates any mental forms, considering the soul as a simple entity capable of knowing the world on its own. From his perspective, the soulʹs faculties are merely tools for this cognition, an‎d the reality of an object directly enters the realm of the soul without any intermediary. This research, employing a descriptive-analytical method an‎d gathering data from library resources, comprehensively compares an‎d analyzes the topic across five chapters. It demonstrates that both philosophers presented innovative views in the discussions of psychology (ilm al-nafs).

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