چكيده لاتين
In this thesis, we have addressed the issue of the relationship between fact and moral value in the works of Al-Farabi and Hilary Putnam. This issue is about whether moral values have a reality independent of human insight and inclination, and what kind of reality is this? The explanation of the relationship between fact and moral value is necessary to clarify issues such as the following: Modes of existence of values; The nature of value and moral arguments; The role of ontology in moral sciences such as practical wisdom, jurisprudence, guidance, and demarcation of values, dos and donʹts, and how humans live. Explanation of proof and certainty or not, realism/anti-realism, objectivism/subjectivism, relativism/universalism of values. The method used in this research is logical-philosophical analysis, including conceptual analysis, propositional analysis, systemic analysis, with a comparative approach to the opinions of two philosophers, in order to contrast the opinions, explain and discuss those two thoughts. To explain and solve this problem, we have looked at it from four perspectives: linguistic, epistemological, logical, and scientific. From a linguistic perspective, we have analyzed the descriptive/perscriptive dichotomy and the function of morally thick terms/concepts in resolving the fact/value dichotomy, and we have concluded that, for both Al-Farabi and Putnam, ontological conclusions cannot be drawn from linguistic discussions, and therefore, the relationship between fact and value cannot be concluded from discussions such as description and perscriptive. From an epistemological perspective, we have looked at the discussion of the truth and falsity of moral propositions and judgments and have come to the conclusion that for Al-Farabi, moral values have an external mode of existence, and moral propositions that have a subjective mode of existence exist directly outside of themselves. This statement constitutes Al-Farabiʹs theory of truth and correspondence in ethics. Putnam denies the existence of any external moral objects, so his theory of truth is explained on the basis of the mere justification of moral judgments under the title of warranted assertability; Al-Farabiʹs theory of truth is far from relativism, while Putnam is relativist because he does not consider moral truths to be independent of human insight and inclination. From a logical perspective, we have attempted to explain how moral perceptions are derived from immoral perceptions and have concluded that, according to both Farabi and Putnam, the lack of logical derivation of "ought" from "is" does not lead to the conclusion that moral values are unreal, which is an ontological argument. From a scientific perspective, we have explained the relationship between metaphysics and normative sciences and have concluded that for Al-Farabi, some principles of normative sciences, such as practical wisdom, are based on metaphysics, and the task of metaphysics in normative sciences is to provide a criterion for moral objectivity; Putnam rejects metaphysics and believes that another criterion must be provided for moral objectivity.
