چكيده لاتين
Ontological pluralism is a position in metaontology that has been systematically introduced for over a decade. Nevertheless, a precise formulation and a coherent explanatory framework for it are still lacking. This dissertation aims to address that gap. It begins by examining the historical background, conceptual formulations, classifications, and the various forms of ontological pluralism. The discussion is developed in a way that identifies three overarching frameworks that ontological pluralism presupposes. For each of these general frameworks, a distinct version of ontological pluralism is introduced, treated as a paradigmatic instance of its type. The subsequent chapters are dedicated to an in-depth analysis of these three versions: the Sorting Version, which draws on Aristotelian thought; the Language-Based version, grounded in Carnap’s philosophy; and the Meaning-Based version, based on the work of Hilary Putnam. The discussion then turns to the similarities and differences among these versions. Through a more detailed examination of each, it becomes evident that, in recent years, ontological pluralism has been developed along two parallel yet unrelated formulations. The discussion then moves to more recent debates on ontological pluralism, focusing primarily on a formulation that relates to quantification theory. This approach understands ontological pluralism as the acceptance of multiple existential quantifiers, and is best referred to as quantificational pluralism. These discussions revolve around which quantifiers should be taken as representations of our ontological commitments. They also address whether, assuming the acceptance of multiple quantifiers, we should still accept the generic quantifier, the one used in the semantics of predicate logic and which presupposes a monistic interpretation of ontology, or reject it. The present dissertation ultimately favors the arguments in support of accepting the generic quantifier. This leads to a critical question: if the generic quantifier is indeed accepted, what substantive difference remains between ontological pluralism and monism, beyond a mere difference in symbolic notation? It will be argued that fundamental distinctions do exist between ontological pluralism and monism, and that they are not merely notational variants of one another. More broadly, the dissertation engages a range of issues concerning quantificational pluralism and aims, in the end, to offer a precise and coherent formulation of this position.
