چكيده لاتين
Findings from experimental economics and field studies show that economic actors are not solely opportunistic but encompass at least three types: opportunistic, conditionally cooperative, and unconditionally cooperative. The interplay between these types and their interactions determines whether cooperation forms or fails. Experimental economics, particularly the theory of conditional cooperation, suggests that the key to fostering cooperation lies in influencing conditionally cooperative partners—those who cooperate (or refrain from cooperating) based on the actions of others. Additionally, experimental economics demonstrates that cooperation can be sustained through both punitive measures (e.g., financial penalties) and non-punitive methods (e.g., sorting).
Meanwhile, the theory of unconditional cooperation posits that the core of cooperation lies in the influence of unconditionally cooperative individuals on conditionally cooperative ones, particularly in shaping preferences. According to this theory, many individuals lack fixed preferences before interacting with others, and their preferences are shaped by the context of these interactions. Unconditionally cooperative partners, or cooperation designers, aim to create contexts (through mechanisms such as role-model effects, identity effects, sorting effects, belief effects, and framing effects) that stimulate the cooperative preferences of others.
This study adopts a comparative case study approach, analyzing two cases—Vareh and Jihad-e-Sazandegi—in relation to the theories of conditional and unconditional cooperation, and comparing the two. Data was gathered from secondary sources, including research on Vareh, particularly Dr. Morteza Farhadiʹs work, as well as the memoirs of Jihad-e-Sazandegi volunteers and other related materials.
The study of traditional cooperation in both Vareh and Jihad-e-Sazandegi reveals that Vareh largely exemplifies cooperation based on conditional cooperation, where the main motivation is economic, and exchanges are fully reciprocal. The most crucial method for sustaining cooperation in this context is sorting, where individuals select one another based on the preferences revealed in prior interactions.
In contrast, Jihad-e-Sazandegi is better explained by the theory of unconditional cooperation, where opportunistic actors are initially filtered out through natural or designed sorting mechanisms. Subsequently, unconditionally cooperative partners seek to influence the preferences of conditionally cooperative individuals through factors such as identity, role models, and beliefs (as outlined in behavioral economics literature). Furthermore, other factors, in line with Islamic teachings, may contribute to shaping divine or otherworldly preferences, such as the influence of piety, guardianship, and reliance on God
