چكيده لاتين
With the formation of modern philosophy and attention to consciousness and the mind, new issues were raised in philosophy, some of which became a serious crisis in philosophy. Among others, we can mention the issue of "solipsism". Solipsism, which can be referred to as "self-isolation", implies that a person claims to be knowledgeable only about himself and his ideas, feelings, emotions, and related consciousness, and about other matters. There is no such claim. A solipsist can be skeptical of the outside world or of other minds or both. ...[But some philosophers with the design of] their philosophical system...defend the intersubjectivity of knowledge and negate classical solipsism." (Wittgenstein, 1393: 186). First of all, this research does not intend to deal with the problem of solipsism and intersubjectivity, but it aims to present a similar problem in Ibn Rushdʹs literature and then examine Ibn Rushdʹs answer to it. slow In other words, in his proposal of the problem of reason, Ibn Rashd raises questions to which his proposal of the problem of intellect is an answer, and under one of the questions raised, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity of knowledge is raised. It is possible that Ibn Rushdʹs theory of intellect is an answer to this question.
Aristotle talks about the passive and the active intellect in about the soul, and the functions of these two intellects form the structure of human consciousness. The function of passive intellect or material intellect is the acceptance of reasonableness. Ibn Rashd states that "understanding is nothing but receiving [reasonable] meanings" (Averroes, 2009:351). So, the main event of understanding takes place in relation to the mind of the beast. But what is the mind of a beast and what are its characteristics? Ibn Rashd presents his statement under the following questions, one of which is related to our problem: "If my knowledge and your knowledge are the same in every way, then it is necessary It turns out that when I have reasonable knowledge, you should also have knowledge about it [which is impossible] and many other impossible things [occur. And] if we claim that [the evidence of me and you, two objects] is plural, then it is necessary that the evidence of me and your evidence are one in terms of type, but in terms of the person, they are two [different individuals]. In this way [this degree] will have another degree and this process will continue indefinitely. In this way, it will be impossible for the student to learn [something] from the teacher" (Averroes, 2009:328). The challenge is that if peopleʹs knowledge is the same, it is necessary that the awareness of all people is the same and what person A understands, everyone else understands, but our experience testifies that this is not the case. So the other side must be valid, that is, that there are multiple proofs and each personʹs proofs are unique to him. Therefore, we cannot achieve a single consciousness, and this is where a kind of solipsism occurs. To solve this question, Ibn Rushd proposes a kind of unity in plurality for consciousness. Our research is the examination of Ibn Rushdʹs theory of reason as an answer to the mentioned question. Our effort is to first provide a coherent and defensible reading of Ibn Rushdʹs theory of the unity of reason, and then the possibilities of this Letʹs examine the idea to solve the problem of loneliness.
